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= especially recommended)
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Borgmann: Benjamin: |
"nature" —> natural "aura" —> |
conventional signs —> artistic "aura" —> |
technological signs mechanical reproduction |
| Plato: | speech —> | rhetoric —> | writing |
| Ong: | primary orality —> | chirographic culture —> |
typographicculture |
Student Opener by Jeen Yu, February 8, 2000:
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Excerpt from the presentation: Walter J. Ong observes that to live and understand fully, we need not only proximity but also distance. In light of this, it seems that the information age we now live in represents and reinforces this human need to be simultaneously connected and disconnected—our need to be both proximate and distanced. We experience this optimal state every time we log on to the World Wide Web: friends, colleagues, merchants, and infinite resources and information are all just a click away; we can send, receive, and connect from a safe and comfortable distance. The "technologized word," then, as Ong puts it, both in its form and its function, fulfills this need by giving us unlimited access (unlike some ISPs!) to both the external and our own internal resources of knowledge. |
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Question or challenge posed during the presentation: An interesting conceptual relationship emerges when we conflate the terms "oral" and "aural": a consonant and yet equivocal union of sound and aura. Is "secondary orality," then, a way of restoring (through sound and not vision) the obscured "aura" of our primary oral heritage? |
A hypertext of materials that may be useful for class discussion
(threads that seem to go together and may allow us to link authors, works, and issues)
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Plato, Phaedrus (instructor's initial interrogations or comments in RED) A Digest of Plato's Phaedrus (excerpts assembled and titled by instructor)
[What is the relation between the truth, a lie, a joke, and a myth?] ["Dialectic" is the truth, do you not agree?] [Is dialectic an oral or written form?} [In this and other Platonic dialogues, dialectic investigates love. Is love dialectical in Plato's sense?] [Is writing a truth, lie, joke, or myth?] |
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Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy (instructor's initial interrogations or comments in RED)
[We have seen Borgmann and Benjamin tell what amounts to origin myths ("ancestral environment of information," "aura"). Now Ong tells us about pristine primary orality. Is this another origin myth?] [Can oral cultures have "ideas"?] [What is the relation between an oral "formula" and a "program"?] [By comparison with the integration of oral memory and oral thought, what are the philosophical implications of the von Neumann architecture of contemporary computing that separates "memory" logically and physically from the "processor"?] [Is the thesis of agonistic orality true?] [Oral people cry, too. If they do not have a "subject," does anyone have a subject?] [Does the "originality" of orality, as Ong defines it, translate into such notions of literacy as "translation," "version," "adaptation," or "improvisation"?] [Ong's phenomenology depends primarily on the binary of oral "sound" versus literate "vision." Why is somatism (touch, the body) naturally an ally of sound as opposed to vision?] [Which is more "free": speech or writing?] [Is the telephone a "secondary orality"? Is e-mail a tertiary orality?] [Are binaries—as in "orality and literacy"—an oral or literate phenomenon?] |
| A Digest of Plato's Phaedrus: (text from The Internet Classics Archive) (excerpts selected and titled by instructor of this course) | |
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Phaedr. What do you mean, my good Socrates? How can you imagine that my unpractised memory can do justice to an elaborate work, which the greatest rhetorician of the age spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot; I would give a great deal if I could. Soc. I believe that I know Phaedrus about as well as I know myself, and I am very sure that the speech of Lysias was repeated to him, not once only, but again and again; he insisted on hearing it many times over and Lysias was very willing to gratify him; at last, when nothing else would do, he got hold of the book, and looked at what he most wanted to see, this occupied him during the whole morning; and then when he was tired with sitting, he went out to take a walk, not until, by the dog, as I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, unless it was unusually long, and he went to a place outside the wall that he might practise his lesson. There he saw a certain lover of discourse who had a similar weakness; he saw and rejoiced; now thought he, "I shall have a partner in my revels." And he invited him to come and walk with him. But when the lover of discourse begged that he would repeat the tale, he gave himself airs and said, "No I cannot," as if he were indisposed; although, if the hearer had refused, he would sooner or later have been compelled by him to listen whether he would or no. Therefore, Phaedrus, bid him do at once what he will soon do whether bidden or not. Phaedr. I see that you will not let me off until I speak in some fashion or other; verily therefore my best plan is to speak as I best can. Soc. A very true remark, that of yours. |
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Phaedr. [concluding his reading of Lysias's speech on lovers and non-lovers:] "I believe that I have said enough; but if there is anything more which you desire or which in your opinion needs to be supplied, ask and I will answer." Now, Socrates, what do you think? Is not the discourse excellent, more especially in the matter of the language? Soc. Yes, quite admirable; the effect on me was ravishing. And this I owe to you, Phaedrus, for I observed you while reading to be in an ecstasy, and thinking that you are more experienced in these matters than I am, I followed your example, and, like you, my divine darling, I became inspired with a phrenzy. Phaedr. Indeed, you are pleased to be merry. Soc. Do you mean that I am not in earnest? |
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Soc. [after making a speech on lovers and non-lovers to compete with Lysias, and preparatory to unfolding the long, central myth of love and souls in this dialogue:] I mean to say that as I was about to cross the stream the usual sign was given to me, that sign which always forbids, but never bids, me to do anything which I am going to do; and I thought that I heard a voice saying in my ear that I had been guilty of impiety, and that I must not go away until I had made an atonement. Now I am a diviner, though not a very good one, but I have enough religion for my own use, as you might say of a bad writer—his writing is good enough for him; and I am beginning to see that I was in error. O my friend, how prophetic is the human soul! At the time I had a sort of misgiving, and, like Ibycus, "I was troubled; I feared that I might be buying honour from men at the price of sinning against the gods." Now I recognize my error. Phaedr. What error? Soc. That was a dreadful speech which you brought with you, and you made me utter one as bad. |
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Soc. [from the dialogue's myth of love and souls:] And there is a law of Destiny, that the soul which attains any vision of truth in company with a god is preserved from harm until the next period, and if attaining always is always unharmed. But when she is unable to follow, and fails to behold the truth, and through some ill-hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her wings fall from her and she drops to the ground, then the law ordains that this soul shall at her first birth pass, not into any other animal, but only into man; and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or artist, or some musical and loving nature; that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be some righteous king or warrior chief; the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician, or economist, or trader; the fourth shall be lover of gymnastic toils, or a physician; the fifth shall lead the life of a prophet or hierophant; to the sixth the character of poet or some other imitative artist will be assigned; to the seventh the life of an artisan or husbandman; to the eighth that of a sophist or demagogue; to the ninth that of a tyrant-all these are states of probation, in which he who does righteously improves, and he who does unrighteously, improves, and he who does unrighteously, deteriorates his lot.
Compare the paradigm of the Divided Line in The Republic, Bk. 6:
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Soc. Shall we discuss the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing? Phaedr. Very good. Soc. In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of the matter about which he is going to speak? Phaedr. And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgment; nor with the truly good or honourable, but only with opinion about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion, and not from the truth. Soc. The words of the wise are not to be set aside; for there is probably something in them; and therefore the meaning of this saying is not hastily to be dismissed. Phaedr. Very true. |
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Soc. I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer description if art could give us one. Phaedr. What are they? Soc. First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear. Phaedr. What is the other principle, Socrates? Soc. The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason; and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name—after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name, but divine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits. Phaedr. Most true. Soc. I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to think. And if I find any man who is able to see "a One and Many" in nature, him I follow, and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god." And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians; but God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your or to Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others teach and practise? Skilful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who is willing to make kings of them and to bring gifts to them. Phaedr. Yes, they are royal men; but their art is not the same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my opinion, dialecticians:-Still we are in the dark about rhetoric.
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| Truth and the Dialectic (2)
Soc. The method which proceeds without analysis is like the groping of a blind man. Yet, surely, he who is an artist ought not to admit of a comparison with the blind, or deaf. The rhetorician, who teaches his pupil to speak scientifically, will particularly set forth the nature of that being to which he addresses his speeches; and this, I conceive, to be the soul. Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. His whole effort is directed to the soul; for in that he seeks to produce conviction. Phaedr. Yes. Soc. Then clearly, Thrasymachus or any one else who teaches rhetoric in earnest will give an exact description of the nature of the soul; which will enable us to see whether she be single and same, or, like the body, multiform. That is what we should call showing the nature of the soul. Phaedr. Exactly. Soc. He will explain, secondly, the mode in which she acts or is acted upon. Phaedr. True. Soc. Thirdly, having classified men and speeches, and their kinds and affections, and adapted them to one another, he will tell the reasons of his arrangement, and show why one soul is persuaded by a particular form of argument, and another not. Phaedr. You have hit upon a very good way. Soc. Yes, that is the true and only way in which any subject can be set forth or treated by rules of art, whether in speaking or writing. But the writers of the present day, at whose feet you have sat, craftily, conceal the nature of the soul which they know quite well. Nor, until they adopt our method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art? Phaedr. What is our method? Soc. I cannot give you the exact details; but I should like to tell you generally, as far as is in my power, how a man ought to proceed according to rules of art. Phaedr. Let me hear. Soc. Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls-they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes: "Such and such persons," he will say, are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way," and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, "This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion"; he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned; when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art, he who says "I don't believe you" has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, and Socrates, your account of the so-called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another? |
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| The Myth of Theuth, God of Writing
Soc. Enough appears to have been said by us of a true and false art of speaking. Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. But there is something yet to be said of propriety and impropriety of writing. Phaedr. Yes. Soc. Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God? Phaedr. No, indeed. Do you? Soc. I have heard a tradition of the ancients, whether true or not they only know; although if we had found the truth ourselves, do you think that we should care much about the opinions of men? Phaedr. Your question needs no answer; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard. Soc. At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis is sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To them came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them. He enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality. Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of Egypt, or of any other country. Soc. There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oaks first gave prophetic utterances. The men of old, unlike in their simplicity to young philosophy, deemed that if they heard the truth even from "oak or rock," it was enough for them; whereas you seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, but who the speaker is and from what country the tale comes. Phaedr. I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke; and I think that the Theban is right in his view about letters. Soc. He would be a very simple person, and quite a stranger to the oracles of Thamus or Ammon, who should leave in writing or receive in writing any art under the idea that the written word would be intelligible or certain; or who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters? Phaedr. That is most true. Soc. I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like painting; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not: and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves. Phaedr. That again is most true. Soc. Is there not another kind of word or speech far better than this, and having far greater power—a son of the same family, but lawfully begotten? Phaedr. Whom do you mean, and what is his origin? Soc. I mean an intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner, which can defend itself, and knows when to speak and when to be silent. Phaedr. You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which written word is properly no more than an image? Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean. And now may I be allowed to ask you a question: Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense, take the seeds, which he values and which he wishes to bear fruit, and in sober seriousness plant them during the heat of summer, in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? at least he would do so, if at all, only for the sake of amusement and pastime. But when he is in earnest he sows in fitting soil, and practises husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight months the seeds which he has sown arrive at perfection? Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest; he will do the other, as you say, only in play. Soc. And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding, than the husbandman, about his own seeds? Phaedr. Certainly not. Soc. Then he will not seriously incline to "write" his thoughts "in water" with pen and ink, sowing words which can neither speak for themselves nor teach the truth adequately to others? Phaedr. No, that is not likely. Soc. No, that is not likely-in the garden of letters he will sow and plant, but only for the sake of recreation and amusement; he will write them down as memorials to be treasured against the forgetfulness of old age, by himself, or by any other old man who is treading the same path. He will rejoice in beholding their tender growth; and while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like, this will be the pastime in which his days are spent. Phaedr. A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, the pastime of a man who can be amused by serious talk, and can discourse merrily about justice and the like. Soc. True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who, finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows and plants therein words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but have in them a seed which others brought up in different soils render immortal, making the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of human happiness. Phaedr. Far nobler, certainly. Soc. And now, Phaedrus, having agreed upon the premises we decide about the conclusion. Phaedr. About what conclusion? Soc. About Lysias, whom we censured, and his art of writing, and his discourses, and the rhetorical skill or want of skill which was shown in them-these are the questions which we sought to determine, and they brought us to this point. And I think that we are now pretty well informed about the nature of art and its opposite. Phaedr. Yes, I think with you; but I wish that you would repeat what was said. Soc. Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul, and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the more complex nature-until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to be subjected to art, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading;-such is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument. Phaedr. Yes, that was our view, certainly. Soc. Secondly, as to the censure which was passed on the speaking or writing of discourses, and how they might be rightly or wrongly censured-did not our previous argument show?- Phaedr. Show what? Soc. That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was or will be, whether private man or statesman, proposes laws and so becomes the author of a political treatise, fancying that there is any great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of his so writing is only a disgrace to him, whatever men may say. For not to know the nature of justice and injustice, and good and evil, and not to be able to distinguish the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be otherwise than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of the whole world. Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written, is of any great value, if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or instruction; and who thinks that even the best of writings are but a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and graven in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness, and that such principles are a man's own and his legitimate offspring;-being, in the first place, the word which he finds in his own bosom; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his others;-and who cares for them and no others-this is the right sort of man; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become like him. Phaedr. That is most assuredly my desire and prayer. Soc. And now the play is played out; and of rhetoric enough. Go and tell Lysias that to the fountain and school of the Nymphs we went down, and were bidden by them to convey a message to him and to other composers of speeches-to Homer and other writers of poems, whether set to music or not; and to Solon and others who have composed writings in the form of political discourses which they would term laws-to all of them we are to say that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are to be called, not only poets, orators, legislators, but are worthy of a higher name, befitting the serious pursuit of their life. Phaedr. What name would you assign to them? Soc. Wise, I may not call them; for that is a great name which belongs to God alone,-lovers of wisdom or philosophers is their modest and befitting title. Phaedr. Very suitable. Soc. And he who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long patching, and piecing, adding some and taking away some, may be justly called poet or speech-maker or law-maker. Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. Now go and tell this to your companion. Phaedr. But there is also a friend of yours who ought not to be forgotten. Soc. Who is he? Phaedr. Isocrates the fair:-What message will you send to him, and how shall we describe him? Soc. Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; but I am willing to hazard a prophecy concerning him. Phaedr. What would you prophesy? Soc. I think that he has a genius which soars above the orations of Lysias, and that his character is cast in a finer mould. My impression of him is that he will marvelously improve as he grows older, and that all former rhetoricians will be as children in comparison of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with rhetoric, but that there is in him a divine inspiration which will lead him to things higher still. For he has an element of philosophy in his nature. This is the message of the gods dwelling in this place, and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates, who is my delight; and do you give the other to Lysias, who is yours. Phaedr. I will; and now as the heat is abated let us depart. Soc. Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities? Phaedr. By all means. Soc. Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry. Anything more? The prayer, I think, is enough for me. Phaedr. Ask the same for me, for friends should have all things in common. Soc. Let us go. THE END |
